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Introduction
The impetus for the development of principles-based ethics in
contemporary health care may have been the Belmont Report, a work of the
federal government dealing with the protection of human subjects of
research.] Subsequent researchers have further explored and commented
on principles-based ethics to the degree that it can be stated with
confidence that the prevailing theory of bioethics in current usage is based
on variously defined sets of principles. 2 The de facto standard has
generally come to be accepted as the four-principles approach advocated
by Beauchamp and Childress in what has become a standard reference text
in bioethics, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1994).
The four principles espoused by Beauchamp and Childress are
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. The authors defend
these principles on the basis that they "initially derive from considered
judgments in the common morality and medical tradition that form (the)
starting point in (their) volume."3 However, their list of principles is not
exhaustive. Other researchers have added veracity, confidentiality,
integrity, utility, double effect, and respect, among others, to the list. 4
In spite of some disagreement on a list of universal principles, the
model of a principles-based bioethics, and particularly the four-principles
approach, enjoys wide acceptance in both professional and academic
bioethics communities.
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However, in fairness to those who disagree with principles-based
bioethics, this grounding of bioethics on "principles" is not without
controversy. Clouser and Gert argue that the "principles of biomedical
ethics" approach, what they call principiism, is
. .. mistaken about the nature of morality and is misleading as to the
foundations of ethics. At best, "principles" operate primarily as
checklists naming issues worth remembering when considering a
biomedical moral issue. At worst, " principles" obscure and confuse
moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic
and unsystematic use of moral theory. 5

This paper will seek first to briefly review the various principles that
are widely commented upon in the bioethics community. Second and
foremost, it will seek to examine and contrast the principles of autonomy
and respect. The distinction between the two is important. Autonomy,
widely viewed as the cornerstone of secular bioethical principles, is often
used to justify procedures such as abortion, euthanasia, and right-to-die
advocacy. The principle of respect, in contrast, attaches a greater
proportional value to human life than to autonomy or privacy. An
understanding of this distinction can be of value to the Chlistian bioethicist
or physician faced with a clinical moral dilemma.
The Principles of Bioethics
While not meant to be a complete list, the following represents a
review of the more widely accepted principles of bioethics in
contemporary usage.
The principle of beneficence refers to acts performed for the benefit
of others. It encompasses acts of mercy and kindness and the obligation to
do good and avoid evil. Within the Christian tradition, a famous example
of beneficence is found in the parable of the Good Samaritan. A key
element of the parable is the ideal of a positive beneficence - that is, a
positive obligation to provide benefit to others. There are some who argue
that such a positive obligation does not exist. Instead, they say that
beneficence is purely a virtuous ideal or act of charity, and thus persons are
not morally deficient if they fail to act beneficently.6 From the Christian
perspective, of course, the teachings of Jesus are clear insofar as one's
positive obligation to their neighbor.
Nonmaleficence is the moral imperative not to inflict harm or evil.
It is related to, but differs from beneficence, in that nonmaleficence
admonishes one in the negative, not to do harm. The principle of
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beneficence involves a positive action toward preventing or removing
Nonmaleficence and beneficence are further related in terms of
actions that involve determination of a risk-to-benefit ratio and the
principle of double effect.
A common example of the concept of risk-to-benefit ratio would
include the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of malignant tumors. The
medication will cause some harm to normal tissues and to the patient, but
the expected benefits ordinarily outweigh the risk or the degree of harm to
the patient. In such situations, the "harm" caused to the patient is morally
defensible.
The principle of double-effect is derived from the work of the
Catholic philosopher and theologian , St. Thomas Aquinas. According to
this principle, some actions may have other than the intended effect. In
some cases, these unintended effects may be bad or harmful. However, the
action can be justified if the bad effect is the unintended result of the initial
good act. The classic example in medicine is the pregnant woman who
develops uterine cancer. The proper treatment may include removal of the
uterus, which in tum will cause the death of the fetus. The death of the
fetus is an unintended result of the properly indicated and beneficial
surgery. As such, it is morally permissible. 8
The principle of veracity deals with the obligation of the practitioner
and the patient to deal with each other in honesty and truth. While it might
seem obvious that the practitioner should deal truthfully with the patient, it
should be just as clear that the patient has the same responsibility to be
truthful with his or her physician. Truthfulness, aside from being an
obvious moral obligation, has legal implications in terms of disclosure and
informed consent. The doctrine of disclosure is the ba~s for the obligation
of the practitioner to provide the patient with the amount and kind of
information necessary to understand the nature of the condition and the
various options that may be available. The doctrine of informed consent
requires that before any risky or invasive procedure can be performed, the
practitioner must inform the patient of pertinent details about the nature of
the procedure, its purpose, potential risks involved, and any reasonable
alternatives that may be available. 9
Among the oldest principles of medical ethics is the promise made
by physicians to keep confidential any information obtained in the course
of treating their patients. 1O Confidentiality deals with the patient's
legitimate expectation that the details of their private lives, health, and
treatment will be kept confidential. This right to privacy is seen as critical
to the doctor-patient relationship. Without it, the patient may feel the need
to withhold information which may be necessary in order to receive proper
medical care. However, confidentiality is not an absolute right. Under
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certain circumstances, such as child abuse, physicians have a moral
obligation (and in many instances a legal one) to report the suspected abuse
to the appropriate agencies. Children are rightly to be viewed as
vulnerable and in need of protection when their physical or mental health is
threatened. In such cases, society's interest in the welfare of these children
outweighs the patient'S right to confidentiality.
Consequentialism is the moral theory that states that an action is
good or bad depending on the balance of its good or bad consequences.
Entire moral theories have been developed on the idea that an action should
be judged by its consequences rather than the intention. II In this regard,
when we are faced with a choice of more than one morally permissible act,
it is the principle of utility that should guide us to choose the one that
benefits the most people.
The principle of justice deals with fairness, that is, that persons
receive what is their due. In health care, it is most often distributive justice
that concerns us. It is the principle which governs the fair distribution of
resources. Problems arise when resources become scarce. In the era of
managed care and efforts to contain rapidly escalating costs, many ethicists
have concerned themselves with questions of how to properly allocate
scarce resources and access to adequate health care. The problem is
especially difficult because of a myriad of complex issues such as the
definition of adequate health care, and the government's role in the
distribution of tax dollars which pay for much of health care in this country
today.
Autonomy and Respect
Autonomy, concisely defined, is the right of self-det;rmination. It
allows for persons to determine their own course of action, or what
interventions they will allow upon themselves. It has become an integral
part of contemporary health care ethics, and has gained sacrosanct status in
secular bioethics. ' 2 Consider the following statements:
... there are relatively few bioethicists who argue that respect for
autonomy is not the preeminent value governing the actions of health
care providers. 13
... from the outset, the conceptual framework of bioethics has
accorded paramount status to the va lue-complex of individualism,
underscoring the principles of individual rights, autonomy, selfdetermination, and their legal expression in the jurisprudential notion
of privacy. 14
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Modern interpretations of autonomy have been influenced by the
philosophies of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. The perspective of
Kant was that a rational being existed as an end in himself. As such, all
persons have an unconditional worth, each having the capacity to
determine his or her own destiny.1 5 To not violate that autonomy was a
fundamental moral obligation. This Kantian notion of autonomy seems to
dominate current bioethical thought. 16 It is easy to see how this
philosophical approach to autonomy can be used to defend such practices
as abortion - upholding the woman's autonomy to choose and denying
the personhood (rational nature) of the embryo/fetus. Likewise with
proponents of euthanasia and assisted suicide who argue that terminally iII
persons have the autonomous right to choose the time and manner of their
death. This near absolute view of autonomy and self-determination finds
support in the legal arena in relation to the concept of privacy.
Privacy, as a legal concept in the United States, is a relatively new
notion arising from various legal decisions during this century. First called
a "liberty interest," the U.S. courts later began to use the term "privacy" to
refer to an individual's protection from interference in matters of personal
choice. Although not specifically enumerated as a constitutional right, the
decisions of the Supreme Court have upheld privacy as a constitutional
right because it seemed (to them) to be implied within the Bill of Rights.
While no doubt controversial in some cases, the Supreme Court has been
consistent in supporting this view in essentially all of its decisions in the
past 30 years. From the moral perspective, of course, it is the case of Roe
v. Wade (1973) that serves as the pivotal event in support of autonomy at
any cost.
Autonomy and privacy seem so intimately related that Beauchamp
and Childress offer respect for one's autonomy as the primary justification
for the light to privacy. Having done so, they quickly ~dmit that objections
to this view do exist. Although they choose not to pursue or discuss those
objections further, they do state that "one possibility ... is to emphasize a
broader conception of respect for persons that includes both respect for
their autonomy and respect for their dignity" (italics added).17 This
statement of theirs seemingly offers a foothold for those who would argue
against that notion of an absolute autonomy which is so prevalent today.
Carl E. Schneider, in his book The Practice of Autonomy, sums it up this
way: " ... now that the law has installed an armory of devices to promote
patients' autonomy, bioethicists and lawyers need to undertake the grubbier
but rewarding work of asking what people actually want, how they actually
behave, and what changes are actually possible."18
Other persuasive arguments can be made against autonomy as the
fundamental bioethical principle. One is that the patient's autonomy and
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decision-making skills may be routinely compromised by illness.
According to Pellegrino and Thomasma:
The patient autonomy model does not give sufficient attention to the
impact of disease on the patient's capacities for autonomy.. . III
persons often become so anxious, guilty, angry, fearful, or hostile
that they make judgments they would not make in calmer times ...
These primary characteristics of illness alter personal wholeness to a
profound degree. They also change some of our assumptions about
the operation of personal autonomy in the one who is ill. 19

Another argument against autonomy is that in order to respect the
autonomy of a patient, the practitioner may have to compromise his or her
own autonomy. For example, the patient's wishes may be contrary to the
morality or value system of the physician. 20 Further, a patient's wishes
may be at odds with their responsibility to the society at large. As an
example, a patient may choose not to be vaccinated against a disease which
presents a danger to the community even though the risk (of vaccination) to
the patient himself is low.21
A most compelling argument against the autonomy model is given
by Nancy Rhoden. Individuals do not exist as totally independent and selfsufficient decision-makers. According to Rhoden, persons cannot be selfgoverning and self-reliant in isolation from others. People exist within a
framework of personal and social relationships. These relationships partly
define who the self is and affect the meaningful expression of autonomy.22
While supportive of autonomy, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill
offers some further insights as to the weaknesses of autonomy. He was
more concerned about the individuality (autonomy) of persons in shaping
their lives. He argued that persons should be permitttd to develop
according to their personal convictions, as long as they do not interfere
with a like expression of freedom by others; but he also insisted that we
sometimes are obligated to seek to persuade others when they have false or
ill-considered views (italics added).23 This view that autonomy may be
relativized, especially in situations involving respect for human dignity,
has served as an impetus for some authors to consider another principle as
more fundamental in bioethics.
The main concept in the principle of respect is the idea that every
human being has inherent dignity and worth. While not generally
considered mainstream in contemporary secular bioethics, the principle of
respect enjoys a considerable amount of support among many researchers.
As early as 1979, the Belmont Report enumerated respect for persons as
one of the three principles that it recommended as the basis of ethical
decision-making in medicine.24 Robert M. Veatch proposes a set of six
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"substantive" principles which includes respect for life and respect for
persons. Although he also includes the principle of autonomy in his list, he
defines it as "the moral necessity of treating one another as autonomous
members of the moral community free to make choices that do not violate
other basic ethical requirements (italics added)?5
A comprehensive treatment of the principle of respect is found in the
work of Beabout and Wennemann, Applied Professional Ethics: A
Developmental Approachfor Use with Case Studies (1994). It is of interest
that while they do not consider the concept of respect for persons to be
essentially religious in character, they have found that many (students)
from diverse traditions identify with it very strongly.26 They go on to say:
The principle of respect for persons will help religious people knit
their central moral beliefs into the fabric of a common public
morality befitting professionals . The moral life ought to be made of
whole cloth . The study of applied professional ethics that focuses on
moral principles should not be carried out in a vacuum. The
challenge of such a study is to help develop a balance between the
diverse personal interests, social roles and moral principles
encountered by professionals. 27

In order to fully appreciate the preeminent nature of respect for
persons as a moral principle, Beabout and Wennemann review the work of
the developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg theorized
that there was a recognized pattern of development in reasoning. At Level
One, the child is primarily interested in himself. Rules are obeyed out of
fear of punishment, or the expectation of a reward. The primary criterion
used for moral decision-making at this level is self-interest. At Level Two,
the emphasis shifts away from oneself to concern for ore's society. This is
called the "conventional" level of moral judgment, since decisions are
based on conformity to the conventions of one's society. Not everyone
moves into this level. But those who do move into Level Two obey rules
because they are part of the society. Conformity is seen as important, as is
concern for fulfilling one's role in society. At Level Three, the emphasis
shifts away from the norms of one's society to a universal perspective that
recognizes impartial moral principles. This highest level is called the
"post-conventional" level , since moral judgments are made based on
universal moral principles that transcend any particular social conventions.
Kohlberg claims that not everyone moves into this level, and rarely do so
before the age of eighteen. At this level, there is a concern for some
universally applicable moral standard: for example: the principle of respect
for all human beings as individuals. Good is done because it is a matter of
conscience to apply a logical, universal standard such as the principle of
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respect. The principle of respect for persons is a self-chosen criterion of
moral decision-making. Further, it can function as a criterion for
evaluating the conventions of societies, including one's own. 28
In their book, Beabout and Wennemann present a list of seven
principles for moral decision-making: respect, non-malevolence,
benevolence, integrity, justice, utility, and double effect. They point out,
however, that all are derived from the foundational principle of respect for
persons. They define this principle as:
In every action and every intention, in every goal and every means,
treat every human being, yourself and others, with the respect
befitting the dignity and worth of a person 29

It is their position that all other (moral) principles are subordinate to
and consistent with respect when considered in a hierarchical order with
respect as the fundamental principle.
It would seem clear that a bioethics based on a fundamental principle
of respect for persons would not be supportive of many of the practices that
contemporary society tolerates on the basis of personal autonomy.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to briefly introduce the concept of principlesbased bioethics, and to concisely review the more widely accepted
principles in contemporary usage. More importantly, its purpose is to
compare and contrast the principles of autonomy and respect, and how they
might influence a more Christian perspective when faced with ethical
dilemmas in health care.
,
Finally, it should be mentioned that principles-based bioethics are
but one aspect of a comprehensive approach to health care ethics that must
ultimately integrate them with values, duties, moral norms, casuistry, and,
especially for the Christian physician, virtue ethics. 30
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